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INTENT V. PRACTICE:
INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR
CHILD ABUSE REPORTING BY SCHOOL PERSONNEL
Jane Rosien*
Lelia Helms..
Carolyn Wanat***
I. INTRODUCTION

There is extensive literature on child abuse and state law
reporting requirements for school personnel. This literature
focuses primarily on descriptions of reporting mandates and on
reviews of the caselaw resulting from instances of abuse
occurring in school settings. 1 The reporting laws, however,
were originally intended to facilitate identification by school
personnel of the broader problem of abuse and neglect arising
in home settings. 2 Lawmakers viewed teachers, by virtue of
their daily intensive contact with students, as being well
positioned to observe and report evidence of abuse by parents
or adults responsible for the care of children. To date, there has
been little discussion in education literature about the
problems that schools encounter in identifying abuse occurring
in home settings. Instead, most analyses describe problems of
abuse occurring in school settings by school personnel or other

* Jane Rosien is a doctoral student in Planning, Policy and Leadership
Studies at The University of Iowa. She has an M.A. in higher education and a
J.D.
** Lelia Helms is an Associate Professor in Planning, Policy and Leadership
Studies at The University of Iowa. She has a Ph.D. in political science and a J.D.
*** Carolyn Wanat is an Assistant Professor in Planning, Policy and Leadership
Studies at The University of Iowa. She has a M.A. in English and a Ph.D. in
Educational Administration.
1.
For a helpful overview see William F. Foster, Child Abuse in Schools: The
Statutory and Common Law Obligations of Educators, 4 EDUC. & L. J. 1 (1992);
Frederica K. Lombard et al., Identifying the Abused Child: A Study of Reporting
Practices of Teachers, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 657 (1986); Ruth V. Siegel, Comment,
Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse: Potential Civil Rights Liability (or School
Districts, 34 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. (1986); Richard G. Salmon & M. David
Alexander, Comment, Child Abuse and Neglect: Implications (or Educators, 28
WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 9 (1985) [hereinafter Salmon & Alexander]; Eric S.
Mondschein, Legal Responsibility of Educators in Child Abuse, in SCHOOL LAW
UPDATE: PREVENTIVE SCHOOL LAW 36 (Jones, Semler, eds., 1984); Sanford N. Katz
et al., Ll!gal Research on Child Abuse and Neglect: Past and Future, 11 FAM. LAW
Q. 151 (1977).
2.
Marjorie R. Freiman, Notes, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the
Law: State Child Abuse Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243 (1982).
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students. This review examines the effects of the statutes and
caselaw which encourage or discourage reporting of abuse by
teachers and administrators. The analysis focuses primarily on
distinguishing between school personnel as reporters of abuse
and neglect in the home and as reporters of abuse within the
school. Cases addressing abuse committed in the home are the
primary source of data. Cases arising from abuse committed by
school personnel are included where the distinctions and
underlying differences in incentive structures facilitate
analysis. This review will first outline federal and state
legislative responses to the societal problem of child
maltreatment. An analysis of the problem of effective
enforcement of the reporting laws in education and a review of
the pertinent caselaw will follow. Discussion of the implications
for implementation and possible reform builds upon these
findings.
II. BACKGROUND
Since 1962, all states, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands have enacted child abuse reporting statutes.
The statutes have undergone a three-phase evolution - (1)
mere identification of the abused child; (2) identification
succeeded by an investigation to authenticate the claim; and (3)
identification, investigation, and intervention to the extent
necessary to prevent further abuse and still support the family
unit. 3 The articulated purpose of state child abuse reporting
statutes is to protect children, not to punish those who mistreat
them. 4 The realization that state child protection laws were
not working led to further reform. 5 In 1974 the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act was signed into federal
legislation. 6 The Act provides incentives for states to amend
their reporting statutes to comply with federal requirements by
providing financial assistance to states that had programs in
place for child abuse and neglect identification, prevention, and

ld. at 252.
Id.
5.
Douglas J. Besharov, Behind Closed Doors, 3 FAM. ADvoc. 3, 4 (1980)
(citing downfalls in the existing agencies and evidence of inadequate procedures for
dealing with the pervasive problem of implementing a child protection system,
including loss of information and unreasonable delays).
6.
Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
5101-5106 (1988)).
3.

4.

__j
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treatment. 7 The costliness of child protection programs made
some financial assistance almost a necessity. Federal
requirements for financial assistance mandate specific
guidelines for the reporting process. These include: reporting of
known and suspected instances of child abuse or neglect;
provisions immunizing reporters from prosecution; prompt
investigation upon receipt of the mandated report to determine
its accuracy and to implement necessary protection for the
child; evidence of administrative procedures, personnel,
training procedures, facilities, and multidisciplinary programs
or services being in effect; preservation of confidentiality of all
records to protect the rights of the child, parents, and guardian;
cooperation of law officials, courts, and state human services
agencies; appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the
child in legal proceedings; assurance of funding equal to the
funding in 1973, appropriate use of federal funds, and an
increase of state funding where possible; public dissemination
of related information; and, where feasible, extension of
preferential treatment to parental organizations combating
child abuse. 8
The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect created
the 1974 Act and developed a Model Child Protection Act9 that
states have used for guidance in developing statutes and
policies. The Model Act includes a concise, working definition of
child abuse and neglect:
... child abuse and neglect means the physical or mental injury,
sexual abuse, negligent treatment, or mistreatment of a child under
the age of eighteen by a person who is responsible for the child's
welfare under circumstances which indicate that the child's health
or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby, as determined in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary. 10

Additional federal legislation included amending the Social
Security Act in 1975 to require states receiving federal social
service grants to provide protective services for physically
abused children. 11

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

u.s.c.

42 U.S.C. § 5104(a)-(b)(l) (1988).
42 u.s.c. § 5102(b)(2) (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 5112 (1988) [hereinafter Model Act].
42 U.S.C. § 5102 (1988).
Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 2337 (1974) (codified as amended in 42
5101-06 (1988)).

102]

CHILD ABUSE REPORTING

105

The fundamental component of state abuse and neglect
statutes is the identification of a cadre of professionals to
function as mandatory reporters of suspected or known child
abuse or neglect. Statutes name physicians, nurses, surgeons,
medical examiners or coroners, dentists, osteopaths,
optometrists, chiropractors, podiatrists, school teachers and
officials, police, peace or law enforcement officers, social
workers, and day care personnel as reporters. 12 As a group of
non-medical reporters, uniquely positioned to observe and
monitor children through consistent and continuing interaction,
teachers are of special interest to this review. 13 Forty-nine
states have included school teachers and officials as mandatory
reporters; Vermont includes school teachers in a category of
permissible reporters. 14 Reports by all persons who know or
have reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect are
generally accepted by most states, regardless of the reporter's
nonmandated status.
Ill. LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF STATUTES
Despite the federal requirements, financial incentives, and
Model Act guidance, state child abuse reporting laws are still
ineffective as a means to protect children through identification
by mandatory reporters, investigation, and intervention. 15
Possible explanations for this limited compliance by school
personnel include: (1) the ambiguities and vagueness of
individual state statutes, (2) the lack of incentives for
mandated reporters to report suspected or known instances of
child abuse or neglect, and (3) the dynamics of school settings
which may deter reporting by teachers under the statutes.
A. Statutory Ambiguity
Three areas of statutory ambiguity may lead to ineffective
reporting: (1) the definitions of "abuse" and "neglect"; (2) the

12.
Salmon & Alexander, supra note 1, at 13.
13.
Nadine Abrahams et al., Teachers' Knowledge, Attitudes and Beliefs About
Child Abuse and Its Prevention, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 229-38 (1992); Garry
Baxter & John Beer, Educational Needs of School Personnel Regarding Child Abuse
and/or Neglect, 67 Pi'>'YCHOL. REP. 75 (1990) [hereinafter B~ter & Beer]; Jody
Aaron, Note, Civil Liabilitv for Teacher's Negligent Failure to Report Suspected
Child Abuse, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 183, 184 (1981).
14.
Salmon & Alexander, supra note 1, at 13.
15.
Model Act, supra note 9, § 6 commentary.
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identification of an abuser; and (3) the degree of certainty
necessary to sustain a report of abuse or neglect. The contents
of the report, the methods of reporting, the agency to which the
report should be made, and the immunization of the reporter
from prosecution are fairly well-defined and generally
understood elements of most state statutes. Other than the
succinct defmition offered by the Model Act, there are no
universal definitions of abuse or neglect upon which mandatory
reporters can prudently rely. "Child abuse" was originally
defmed by the diagnostic term "battered child syndrome," a
medical term which gained common understanding in the
1960s. 16 Today, the definition of "child abuse" is construed
more broadly, including elements of physical injury, mental or
emotional injury, sexual molestation, and neglect. Some states
have chosen to define "child abuse" in this manner in order to
allow case-by-case determinations based upon subjective
criteria. 17 All states define "child abuse" to include physical
injury, but a few do not include sexual abuse, 18 emotional
abuse, 19 or neglect20 in their definitions.
Another ambiguity in many statutes is the identity of the
abuser. Whether or not the injury or omission must result from
a specific person's actions depends upon the scope of the
definition as set forth in the particular state statute. Ten states
include identification of the abuser within the definition of
abuser. 21 In other states reporting is mandatory regardless of
the perpetrator's identity. Examples of policies identifying
potential abusers include: "a parent, or other person legally
responsible for his care or custody of a child less than eighteen
years old," and mistreated "by a person who is responsible for
[his] welfare,"22 It is important to note that the expressed
definitions and guidelines for reporting suspected abuse or
neglect are not necessarily the same guidelines and standards

16.
Note, Child Mistreatment: An Overview of Current Approaches, 18 J. OF
FAM. L. 115, 121 (1979-80).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(12) (West 1986).
17.
Freiman, supra note 2, at 254 n. 88 (citing New Mexico, South Dakota,
18.
Tennessee, and Texas).
19.
ld. at 254, n. 87 (citing Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota,
Oregon, and Wisconsin).
20.
ld. at 254, n. 89 (citing Idaho).
21.
Alan Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 3 Fam.
L. Q. 245, 257 (1974).
22.
ld. at 257.
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that will be used in the final determination of whether or not
the abuse or neglect actually occurred. 23
Finally, the degree of certainty required of a reporter is
customarily codified. In general, there are two different
standards: objective and subjective. An objective standard
refers to "what the reasonable man in similar circumstances
would believe to be the case, whether or not the individual in
question actually formed the belief."24 The statutory language
establishing an objective standard may contain terms such as
"reasonable cause to believe," "cause to believe," or "reason to
believe or suspect."25 The Model Act employs an objective
standard by requiring reporting if one "knows or has
reasonable cause to suspect that abuse or neglect has
occurred.'126 A subjective standard requires only that the
individual reporting the abuse or neglect form the requisite
suspicion to report. States employing the subjective standard
use statutory language such as "the observer believes" or "the
observer suspects.''27 The distinction between these two
standards may potentially determine liability in a civil action
brought against a mandatory reporter for failure to report.

B. Reporting Incentives
Immunity from legal action is the primary incentive states
provide to encourage mandatory reporters to comply with their
statutory duty to report. The rationale for this policy is to deter
the possibility of legal entanglement from the reporter's
perspective. All states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin
Islands, and Puerto Rico have protected mandatory and
voluntary reporters from civil or criminal liability for all acts
required or permitted by the particular statute. 28 This
immunity only applies, however, to those reporters acting in

23.
ALAN SUSSMAN & DAVID COHEN, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION 14, 15 (1975).
24.
Freiman, supra note 2, at 258 n. 125 (citing as examples North Carolina,

Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming).
25.
ld. at 25R.
26.
Model Act, supra note 9, at § 5 commentary.
27.
Freiman, supra note 2, at 258 n. 125 (citing as examples Iowa and Rhode
Island); Aaron, supra note 13 (citing as examples Alabama, California, Delaware,
and New Mexico).
28.
ld. at 263 n. 168 (citing as examples Arizona, Florida, and Indiana).

l
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good faith. 29 The Model Act also contains similar good faith
immunity provisions. 30
Additionally, most state statutes impose penalties for
knowing and willful failures to report. The majority of state
statutes classify the failure to report as a criminal
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in jail, maximum
$1000 fme, or both. 31 The imposition of criminal sanctions for
neglect of a duty requiring such extensive personal judgment
has been criticized as unduly harsh. 32 The risk of criminal
prosecution, however, encourages reporting by offsetting the
"psychological barriers" presented by the feeling of acting as an
informant. 33 A minority of states provide for only civil
penalties and some states provide for both civil and criminal
penalties. 34 Additionally, a "failure to report" may result in
civil liability imposed by applying either statutory negligence or
common law theories. 35 To establish a case of statutory
negligence the plaintiff must prove that the mandated reporter:
(1) had a legal duty to report the abuse or neglect, (2) breached
that legal duty, (3) the failure to report was causally connected
to the resulting harm claimed, and (4) there was injury or
damage. 36 Caselaw also adds to incentives for compliance. For
example, in Aigner v. Cass School Township 37 the appellate
court held that substantial evidence of a teacher's failure to
report a suspected case of child abuse immediately was an
appropriate factor to consider when deciding whether or not to
terminate the teacher's employment contract. Exposure to civil
liability arguably strengthens existing reporting schemes.
Courts may be more willing to impose civil sanctions rather
than criminal penalties, thus the fear of liability would still
compel compliance. 38 Additionally, the risk of civil liability
may operate as a financial deterrent to noncompliance as well

29.
30.
31.

ld.

42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(A) (1988).
Arthur Schwartz & Harold Hirsh, Child Abuse arul Neglect: A Survey of the
Law, 28 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 293, 311 (1982).
ld.
32.
33.
ld.
34.
Freiman, supra note 2, at 261.
35.
Aaron, supra note 13, at 191-207 (giving a full discussion of the
establishment of civil liability through statutory and common law theories of
negligence).
36.
ld. at 195-207.
37.
577 N.E.2d 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
38.
Rowine H. Brown & Richard B. Truitt, Civil Liability in Child Abuse Cases,
54 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 753, 762 (1978).

102]

CHILD ABUSE REPORTING

109

as a means to pay for some of the injuries to the "abused
child."39

C. Dynamics of School Settings
Despite the strong public interest in reporting, studies
confirm that teachers remain reluctant to file reports of known
or suspected child abuse or neglect, 40 and when they do file
reports, teachers oftentimes do not follow procedures specified
in the statutesY A Virginia study found that of the four
major groups reporting suspected child abuse or neglect e.g.,
friends and neighbors, anonymous persons, relatives, public
school teachers; teachers, the only mandatory group of
reporters, contributed the smallest portion of reports (10%). 42
A Kansas study found that elementary teachers were more
likely than high school teachers to suspect and report child
abuse, but that they would report abuse to school officials
rather than to the official reporting agency. 43 Almost one-half
of reported abuse cases involved school age children, but only
twelve percent of reports filed were by school personnel. 44
A more extensive study from Michigan confirmed these
phenomena. 45 The "failure to report problem" is twofold, first,
teachers seldom report and second, when they report, it is not
done in the legally prescribed manner. Teachers acknowledged
that in cases where they failed to report to the proper
authorities, abuse had been observed, but was purposefully not
reported. 46 The Michigan study sought to discriminate
between the types of abuse more likely to be reported by
teachers. Nonaccidental physical injuries, the most frequent
form of abuse, constituted the largest group of unreported, but

39.
!d.
40.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN, HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL
CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING, 1986 (1988); WE&'TAT ASSOCIATES, STUDY
OF THE NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
(1988); Lanthan D. Camblin, Jr. & H. Thompson Preut, School Counselors and the
Reporting of Child Abuse: A Survey of State Laws and Practices, 30 SCH. COUNS.
35R (1983).
41.
Abrahams et al., supra note 13; Baxter & Beer, supra note 13.
42.
VIRGINIA DIVISION FOR CHILDREN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN VIRGINIA,
(1983).
43.
Richard J. Shoop & Lynn M. Firestone, Mandating Reporting of Suspected
Child Abuse: Do Teachers Obey the Law? 46 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 111fi (19RR).
44.
!d. at n. 21.
45.
Lombard et a!., supra note 1.
46.
!d. at 667.
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observed, cases (10.9%). 47 "In contrast, none of the thirty
mental injury cases (0%), two of eighty-one mistreatment cases
(2.5%), and three of eighty-six neglect cases went unreported
(3.5%)."48 This result may appear to be counter-intuitive, and
bears further investigation. The reasons given by teachers who
admitted their failure to report included: fear of reprisals to the
child (thirty-five percent), a feeling the reporting would not
help (thirty-one percent), and opposition to invading family
privacy (ten percent). 49
Research also shows that teachers fail to comply with
statutory procedures for reporting. The Michigan study
revealed that approximately sixty-six percent (87/131) of the
teachers surveyed reported observations of abuse or neglect to
other individuals in their schools and approximately fifty-nine
percent (77/132) reported only to their school principal or
assistant principal. 50 Department of Social Services statistics
supported the same finding--four times as many reports are
filed by principals as teachers. 51 This practice was in clear
violation of the reporting statutes as they were written and
intended to be implemented.
IV. EDUCATIONAL INCENTIVES
INFLUENCING REPORTING

Beyond the reasons set forth in the research, other societal,
organizational, and educational disincentives for reporting may
be identified. Foremost, individual perceptions of the childparent relationship, particularly the parameters of appropriate
discipline, vary greatly. Many teachers hold a stereotype of
"benevolent parenthood" that prohibits them from admitting
the fact that parents do abuse their children. 52 On a broader
scale, privacy values may play some role. Freedom from state
intervention into any aspect of one's life is a highly held
American value. Many teachers believe in the rights of parents
to discipline their children and are not sure about the role of
the school to intrude in this private family matter. 53 Filing a
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.

at 668.
at 669.
at 662
at n.22.

52.
EDSEL L. ERICKSON ET AL., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
EDUCATORS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS (2d ed. 1984).

53.

ld.

A GUIDEBOOK FOR
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report necessitates, at a minimum, some resolution of these
two basic issues by the individual. Others theorize that
teachers are hesitant to report due to a lack of diagnostic
expertise. 54
The professional dynamics of schools may contribute to the
reluctance of teachers to report. Cooperative parent-school
relationships are a cornerstone of successful education. School
administrators, especially principals, strive to create and
maintain positive relations. Teachers' positive interactions with
parents help establish successful school-family relations.
Teachers commonly express anxieties about dealing with
parents 55 since they must interact with parents in multiple
contexts (e.g., parent-teacher conferences, extracurricular
activities, and other school events). Teachers may fear
confrontation with an allegedly abusive parent, especially since
most teachers are personally concerned for the sake of the
child's long-term educational prospects.
In smaller school districts, these dynamics may be further
compounded by factors of scale. Involvement in community
activities presents many opportunities for face-to-face
exchanges. Additionally, the teacher may have personal
acquaintance with the parent who is implicated and not want
to report a "friend." Teachers may often be dissuaded by the
belief that the abuse is an isolated incident which will not
happen again.
Research confirms these dissuading factors. Teachers
attribute their reluctance to report to a lack of community
support and feelings of isolation, particularly in small
communities. 56 Working with a child and parent after a report
has been made also is difficult for a teacher and, in some cases,
causes teachers to fear reprisals. 57 Complying with mandatory
reporting is particularly difficult for a teacher if the principal is
reluctant to report. 58 Some principals are reluctant to risk a
54.
Salmon & Alexander, supra note 1, at 14.
55.
JOSEPH BLASE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE IN SCHOOLS 199 (1991).
56.
Abrahams et al., supra note 13; Bonnie Trudell & Marianne H. Whatley,
School Sexual Abuse Prevention: Unintended Consequences and Dilemmas 12 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 113 (1988); J. Patrick Turbett & Richard O'Toole, Teachers'
Recognition and Reporting of Child Abuse, 53 J. OF SCH. HEALTH 605 (1983).
57.
Abrahams et al., supra note 13; J.D. Alfaro, Impediments to Mandated
Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect in New York City (Unpublished
paper presented at the Seventh National Conference on Child Abuse and Neglect
(Chicago, IL 1985)).
58.
Cynthia C. Tower, How SCHOOLS CAN HELP COMBAT CIDLD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 52 (1987) (a pamphlet published by the NEA); Abrahams et al., supra
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negative image of their schools for having reported suspected
abuse. 59 The organization of schools may also impede
reporting. Schools are governed by lay boards which are
dependent in many respects upon public support and goodwill
for resources. The various levels of hierarchy within the
schools, along with the degree of specialization among teachers
and other staff may serve as environmental buffers. Teachers
report to an assistant principal or principal, a district
superintendent, a school board, and perhaps even the state
department of education. In addition, numerous specialists'
roles support the teaching function. Counselors, social workers,
school nurses, and special education teachers provide
assistance and service coordination for classroom teachers. 60
The mandate to report an instance of child abuse or
neglect directly and independently to an external agency
creates countervailing pressures for teachers as to whom they
owe a duty, whom they are bound to inform, and in what order
this must be effectuated. The mandate for teachers to report
directly to an outside agency conflicts with an environment
where the culture requires cooperative staffing between
multiple specialists to address the problems of an individual
student. This environment may also predispose toward a ''let
someone else report" attitude, 61 especially in a system where a
number of "mandatory reporters" have contact with the child.
In contentious areas, consultation and confirmation by
colleagues may be preferred before action is taken.
Yet, state statutes clearly denote that oral reports are to be
given directly and immediately to the designated social service
agency, followed by a written documentation of the report.
Several policy arguments support this method of reporting.
Social service agency personnel possess the expertise, training
and qualifications to assess the validity of reports. Such
expertise is also necessary to determine when and to what
extent intervention is appropriate. If certain services are
deemed necessary, the social service agency also can provide
these directly. The filing of a claim with social service agencies
requires a formal investigation of all relevant facts. The social

note 13; Cynthia C. Tower, CIDLD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A TEACHER'S HANDBOOK
FOR DETECTION, REPORTING AND CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT 32 (1984).

59.
60.

61.

Tower, 1984 & 1987, supra note 58, at 33 (1984) and 51-52 (1987).
Tower (1984), supra note 58, at 38.
Pat Alford et al., A Profile of the Physical Abusers of Children, 33 SCH.

CoUNS. 143 (1985).
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service agencies have access to the state abuse registries if they
exist in the jurisdiction of 'concern, 62 and are positioned to
make more informed judgments about the extent of, and
appropriate response to, the abuse.
Allowing school principals or other administrative officials
to perform a "screening'' function before filing reports may be
imprudent for several reasons. First, principals are subject to
many of the same pressures affecting teachers. Second, they
bear administrative responsibility for maintaining good
relationships with parents in their attendance areas. One false
or unfounded report can generate parental ire and community
disapproval as well as pose risks to careers in the politicized
environment of local schools. Finally, a principal also lacks the
first-hand knowledge and sensitivity to behavioral changes of
the student that the teacher holds. 63 The need for certainty
and, in some jurisdictions, identification of the abuser may
deter the filing of reports.
There is another perspective, however, on the question as
to which agency should receive reports of abuse. The option of
"gradual reporting" by teacher to administrator and
administrator to agency may remove barriers enough to be
more effective in the long run. By reporting to the
administrator, a teacher may face less personal risk of a
confrontation with a hostile parent. The administrator, in turn,
acts as a protective buffer for teachers in performing their
mandated duty. The teacher may not have to be identified as
the reporter in the formally filed complaint. The chance of
criminal or civil liability may be decreased for the teacher. This
alternative also may appeal to administrators as well. If
administrators are given responsibility to determine whether or
not to report to the social service agency, they may exercise
review authority while still facing the possible threat of legal
liability. He/she may be no more plagued with risk than in the
current system, yet may feel better able to anticipate the
consequences. 64

62.
Freiman, supra note 2; Schwartz & Hirsh, supra note 31.
63.
Lombard et al., supra note 1, at 662-5 (giving a more comprehensive
discussion of reasons for not having principals "screen" reports).
64.
ld.
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UTIGATION OVER REPORTING

The threat of legal liability is often understood to operate
as the primary incentive for abiding by the law. However, this
threat means little without follow-through. The imposition of
liability provides an incentive structure for compliance. To
date, this has been a missing link in the effective
implementation of child abuse reporting laws as they pertain to
school teachers and administrators reporting the abuse and
neglect of children in their home settings.
A WESTLAWS 5 search for all reported state and federal
decisions involving a claim against a school teacher or
administrator for the failure to report child abuse or neglect
was conducted. The query66 retrieved eighty-six state and
eighteen federal cases. Only one reported case in which school
officials were being sued for their failure to report abuse
committed by parents, or someone in a home setting, was
directly on point. 67 Eleven others addressed issues of
reporting related to the administration or effect of the statute.
Of the cases identified, only five involved abuse arising in a
home setting. The other seven alleged abuse occurring in the
school setting including one which addressed the ancillary
problem of disclosure under the public records statutes.
Table 1
Caselaw: Failure to Report Child Abuse
ABUSE IN HOME
(n=5)

FAILURE TO REPORT
Mattingly

IMMUNITY-RETALIATION
Dunajewski
Jenkins
Landstrom
Mattingly
McDonald

65.
66.
67.

ABUSE IN SCHOOL
(n=7)

Bellevue
Grover
Pesce
Aigner
Bellevue
Cromley
Pesce

West Publishing's on-line legal research database.
"'failure to report' 'failure to comply' /p 'child abuse' neglect/25 Child!"
Mattingly v. Casey, 509 N.E.2d 1220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).

102]

CHILD ABUSE REPORTING

INDIRECT REPORTING
Dunajewski
Landstrom
Mattingly

115

Bernstein
Cromley

WHO SUES
PARENTS
Dunajewski*
Jenkins*
Landstrom*
Mattingly
McDonald*

PROSECUTOR
Bernstein
Grover
PARENTS
Bellevue
EMPLOYEES
Aigner
Cromley
Pesce

DISCLOSURE
South Coast Newspapers
* false report

The twelve cases reflect many of the problems identified in
the prior discussion of the reporting statutes. These include
litigation over five basic issues: failure to report, immunity for
reporting and from other forms of retaliation, indirect reporting
or reporting to a non-designated agency, identifying who may
sue, and disclosure.
A. Failure to Report

Four cases directly or indirectly addressed the alleged
failure of school personnel to report abuse. These cases
illustrate a range of variance in the laws. One case68 involved
a failure to report which resulted in the prosecution of a
principal under the criminal misdemeanor provisions of the
reporting statute. The other three addressed the limits of
permissible delay or degree of certainty necessary before filing
a report. 69 One case involved allegations of abuse committed

l
l

68.
State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1989).
69.
Mattingly, 509 N.E.2d at 1220; Pesce v. Sterling Morton High Sch., 830
F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1987); Bellevue Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Benson, 707 P.2d 137
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
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in the home setting, 70 while the other three dealt with abuse
occurring in the school. 71
The issue of determining what constituted abuse subject to
the reporting laws was at the core of two cases. One case
directly addressed a claim that school personnel had failed to
report abuse under the statute's criminal penalties for
nonreporting. 72 The alleged abuse in this case was committed
by teachers and illustrates the difficulty of defining an
appropriate, commonly understood standard of abuse
particularly when allegations are somewhat vague and against
subordinate employees. The question involved discerning
possible sexual abuse from discipline by an elementary teacher
who was alleged to have "pinched [a student] on the buttocks
on two occasions, . . . having squeezed the buttocks of [a
student] . . . having choked [a student] in class and in the
bathroom, ... and having patted [a student] on the buttocks as
she was leaving the classroom.'m The parents of the two
students involved contacted the social services reporting agency
after complaining to the principal, who decided not to act upon
the allegation. The principal's constitutional challenge to his
subsequent conviction for failing to report was based upon
grounds of statutory vagueness and overbreadth, but was
denied by the court. The second case involved similar
allegations of abuse arising in the school setting by school
employees and the degree of certainty necessary to require
filing a report. A principal was demoted for not reporting abuse
described to him by a school custodian. The custodian told the
principal that a sixth-grade girl had said that she had had
sexual intercourse with another custodian two days earlier. The
girl told no other school personnel about the incident. Based on
the unconfirmed, secondhand nature of the complaint, the
principal filed no formal report. 74
The remaining two cases further illustrate issues arising
from the degree of latitude in reporting accorded to school
personnel both as to the timeliness and the evidence of abuse.
Mattingly involved a claim of negligence against school
personnel, including a teacher, school nurse, and a principal,

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
1985).

Mattingly, fi09 N.E.2d at 1220.
Grover, 437 N.W.2d at 60; Pesce, 830 F.2d at 789; Benson, 707 P.2d at 137.
Grover, 437 N.W.2d at 60.
ld. at 60.
Bellevue Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Benson, 707 P.2d 137 (Wash. Ct. App.
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for failure to report abuse in a timely fashion. School personnel
had observed at least sixteen instances of bruises and cuts in
the same pupil over a two year period but had accepted the
step-mother's explanations for each and had not filed a report.
The school nurse finally filed a report two months before the
pupil suffered a fatal beating. The court found that the actions
of the personnel did not violate their duty to report under the
statutes since the officials could exercise some judgment as to
whether each instance of bruises and cuts constituted abuse
and since they finally did report. School personnel were
permitted "to consider the gravity of the child's hurts, what
they know about [the] family, and what this portended. Section
51A does not require the reporting of every bruise; it requires
reporting on the basis of indicators which give reasonable cause
to believe that a child is being abused." 75
Pesce 76 provides an interesting contrast in terms of the
elapsed time and degree of certainty allowed before filing the
requisite report. Pesce, a tenured teacher and school
psychologist/counselor, was disciplined by the school board for
his ten day delay in failing to report suspected child abuse. The
court sustained the school district's disciplinary action against
the counselor for failure to comply with the statute which
required "prompt" reporting of suspected abuse."
The facts in Pesce indicated that a male student, upon the
urging of a worried friend, visited Dr. Pesce for counseling.
Mter Dr. Pesce assuring the student of the confidentiality of
their conversations, the student claimed that a teacher had
shown him pornographic pictures during a visit to his home.
Although he denied any sexual acts during the encounter with
the teacher and any resultant suicidal intentions, the student
indicated confusion and concern over his own sexual
preference. Ten days later, after two additional and one
cancelled meeting, the student revealed to Dr. Pesce and a
professional therapist that the encounter with the teacher had,
in fact, involved sexual contact. At that point Dr. Pesce, with
the student's consent, reported the incident to the
superintendent and the responsible social services agency. The
elapsed time period between initial suspicion of suspected
abuse and confirmation by the victim was ten days.

75.
76.

Mattingly v. Casey, 509 N.E.2d 1220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
Pesce v. Sterling Morton High Sch., 830 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1987).
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B. Immunity I Retaliation
The most commonly litigated issue in the cases involved
immunity for reporting. In the cases identified in this search
immunity had two components: immunity from legal liability
for the act of reporting; and immunity from resulting changes
in employment status. The former arose from state law
provisions giving protection to reporters for filing reports. The
latter is generally not addressed in state statutory schemes.
Immunity does not extend to the employment consequences for
school personnel of either reporting or failing to report. Five
cases addressed in some way the scope of immunity from
liability for reporting. All involved allegations of abuse by
parents or persons in the home setting. All sustained the
immunity of school personnel for reporting, even when no basis
for the allegation was later found 77 or when delays in
reporting adversely affected the child. 78 Nor could liability
under either state or federal civil rights statutes be invoked. 79
Though limited, the cases on point demonstrate that courts
sustain the provisions for immunity from suit with some
regularity.
As indicated above, state laws providing immunity for
reporting do not extend to actions taken against school
personnel in the context of their employment. Four cases dealt
with what weight either reporting or failing to report could be
given in subsequent disciplinary actions against school
personnel. All four cases involved allegations of abuse in the
school setting. Three cases identified by this research confirm
that a delay or failure to report may be considered as evidence
of competence when making a decision is made to renew a
teacher's contract80 or as a basis for disciplining or demoting
school personnel. 81 Due process protections must be employed
in such actions. 82

77.
Jenkins v. Marava, No. CIV A. 89-0284-Z 1990 WL 98048 (D. Mass. June
29, 1990); Landstrom v. Barrington Sch. Dist., 739 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990);
Dunajewski v. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High Sch., 526 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988); McDonald v. State, 694 P.2d 569 (Ore. Ct. App. 1985).
78.
Mattingly, 509 N.E.2d at 1220.
79.
Jenkins, 1990 WL at 98048.
80.
Aigner v. Cass Sch. Township, 577 N.E.2d 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
81.
Pesce v. Sterling Morton High Sch., 830 F.2d 7!'19 (7th Cir. 1987); Bellevue
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Benson, 707 P.2d 137 (Wash. Ct. App. 19!'15).
82.
Benson, 707 P.2d at 137.
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The fourth case, however, identified a much more
problematic fact pattern. Cromley 83 involved a charge of
retaliatory discharge against a school district. Marcella Ann
Cromley, a teacher, filed a report of abuse directly to the social
services agency after her principal failed to act upon her
informing him of the alleged abuse. The abuse alleged in the
case was committed by another teacher in Cromley's
department. Cromley learned of the abuse from the student
directly. Subsequently, Cromley was forbidden to speak to the
social services worker investigating the report, removed as
department head, criticized by other faculty for false
evaluations and criticism, and eventually discharged from
employment. The reported decision in this case dealt with the
weight accorded to First Amendment protections in termination
from employment, and resulted in a motion to dismiss being
granted to the school district.

C. Indirect Reporting
Direct reporting, the requirement that teachers or school
personnel independently file reports of child abuse with the
designated child protection agency, is the preferred statutory
reporting scheme. However, indirect reporting, or the
consultation and screening of reports through intermediary
officials, would appear to dominate practice. While the practice
of indirect reporting was an issue in only two cases, 84 all but
two of the remaining ten cases85 revealed factual patterns in
which the mandatory reporter either consulted with other
school personnel or deferred responsibility for reporting to
another. State statutory provisions, which generally require
direct reporting to state child protective services, do not appear
to be followed in practice. The two cases raising this issue did
not repudiate reliance upon direct reporting.
In People v. Bernstein,86 the criminal conviction of a school
district administrator for failure to report child abuse was
reversed. The administrator had reported an instance of abuse
to a school police unit rather than to the county agency. The

83.
Cromley v. Board of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Dunajewski v. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High Sch., 526 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App.
84.
Div 1988); People v. Bernstein, 243 Cal. Rptr. 363 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1987).
85.
State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1989); Benson, 707 P.2d at 137.
86.
243 Cal. Rptr. 363 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1987).
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court held that the school district's police unit constituted a
"child protective agency" within the meaning of the statute and,
consequently, the administrator had complied with the
reporting mandate. 87
In a second case, Dunajewski, a court found that no libel
had occurred in a civil suit when, in addition to a report made
to the child protective agency, the report was sent to the
school's internal committee responsible for reviewing the needs
of special education students. The student who was the subject
of the report had had prior behavioral and academic problems.
The court determined that the committee constituted an
"authorized recipient". 88
Although not a cause of action in the remaining cases,
problems with reports made to other agencies or school
personnel were evident in many cases identified in this survey.
The pattern and practice of school personnel who consulted
with each other over a two-year period about questions as the
evidence of child abuse was documented in Mattingly, a case
discussed earlier. 89 Cromley v. Board of Education, 90 a case
involving the issue of retaliatory discharge, illustrates the
troublesome conflicts and pressures upon school personnel
when the screening or referral of reports occurs where the
alleged abuse is by other teachers or employees.
Finally, Landstrom91 illustrates additional legal issues
under Monell 92 raised by the conflict between statutory
requirements for direct reporting to social service agencies by
mandatory reporters and the actual practice of consultation
and deferral to administrators' decisions in such matters. In an
action for damages involving a report of abuse which later
proved to be unfounded, parents sued a school district rather
than the teacher. The teacher had reported abuse to her
principal, who independently evaluated the situation and filed
a report with the child protective agency. The case was decided
on a question of whether the school district would be held
liable for the principal's alleged civil rights violations under
Monell. Important to the facts, although not crucial to the
outcome, was the teacher's independent duty under state law to

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Bernstein, 243 Cal. Rptr at 365.
Dunajewski, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
Mattingly v. Casey, 509 N.E.2d 1220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
699 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Ill 1988).
739 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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report abuse directly. Consultations between teachers and
administrators prior to reporting may broaden the scope of
liability for not reporting to include the district as a whole.
This may result in a transfer of liability to the school district
as the practice of indirect reporting becomes entrenched. Such
a practice may benefit plaintiffs in search of deeper pockets.
The economics of litigation from a plaintiffs perspective creates
incentives to sue the district in addition to, or instead of, a
teacher or principal when responsibility for reporting decisions
can be shown to be attributable to the district.

D. Who May Sue
The issue of who may sue to enforce mandatory reporting is
important to ensure the effectiveness of compliance with the
statutory mandate. Generally, prosecutors appear to be
reluctant to initiate criminal action against school personnel for
their failure to report. Only two cases in this survey involved
criminal prosecutions. 93 Both cases involved abuse occurring
in school settings. Only one case directly dealt with a failure to
report, 94 whereas the second dealt with a report filed with the
wrong agency. 95
In civil suits, cases where a prosecutor may have opted not
to pursue criminal sanctions, parents are the party with the
greatest incentives for suing the alleged abuser, the negligent
reporter, or the agencies responsible for removing the child
from the custody of the family. 96 Similarly, when the abuse is
committed by school personnel, parents have every incentive to
sue for the failure to report, whether to recover damages or to
force the district to remove the offending parties. However, in
cases where the parent or someone in the home setting is the
perpetrator of the abuse, a civil suit may be impossible in
practice. In reality, there is no one available with the
incentives or motivation to sue on behalf of the child for a
failure to report. Although a guardian ad litem or a social
service agency has the authority to sue the school, principal, or
teacher on behalf of the child abused in the home setting when
there is a failure to report, no evidence that this sanction is

93.
State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1989); People v. Bernstein, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 363 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1987).
Grover, 437 N.W.2d at 60.
94.
95.
Bernstein, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
96.
Brown & Truitt, supra note 39, at 767.
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employed to enforce the reporting law was found in this survey.
Although parents filed suits when reports alleging abuse in the
home setting were later found to be false, 97 only one case was
identified in which a parent sued for a school's delay in
reporting abuse of his child by her stepmother. 98 The court
rejected the father's attempt to recover damages from the
school as an unacceptable shifting of responsibility from
himself, in his capacity as father, present in the home during
the period when the abuse took place, to public officials.

E. Disclosure
A somewhat unrelated case deserves brief
acknowledgement because of the plausible disincentive it offers
for enhancing implementation of the mandatory reporting laws.
In a suit for access to police records by a newspaper, a
California court of appeals held that the public was entitled to
access to a copy of the police report of an investigation
undertaken by officers after an oral complaint from residents
and parents that the high school principal had failed to report
an incident of child abuse. While the court imposed guidelines
and restrictions to protect procedural, constitutional and other
legal rights, the general right of disclosure allowed under state
law in this case may further add to the general reluctance of
school personnel to report. The disincentives to report may be
magnified by the fact that the report can become public
knowledge. 99

VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite limited evidence, analysis of the caselaw appears to
confirm many of the critiques of the child abuse reporting
statutes in educational settings. Very few decisions involving
the failure of school districts to comply with the reporting
statutes as to abuse or neglect arising in home settings have
been reported. The limited case law on failure to report abuse
97.
Jenkins v. Matava, No. CN. A. 89-0284-Z, 1990 WL 98048 (D. Mass. June
29, 1990); Landstrom v. Barrington Sch. Dist., 739 F. Supp 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990);
Dunajewski v. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High Sch., 526 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (App. Div.
1988); McDonald v. State, 694 P.2d 569 (Ore. Ct. App. 1985).
Mattingly v. Casey, 509 N.E.2d 1220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)
98.
(the delay was two years).
South Coast Newspapers v. City of Oceanside, 206 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Ct. App.
99.
1984).
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arising in the home may reinforce the general evidence that
school personnel contribute a relatively small portion of child
abuse reports which are filed. While the reasons for this are
not clear, analysis of the few cases in this area sheds some
light on the incentives and disincentives which may condition
reporting of abuse arising in home settings.
Ironically, the caselaw addressing reports of abuse
occurring in school settings appears with greater frequency and
receives greater attention in the education literature. Clear
distinctions emerge in the incentive structures which
differentiate and motivate the reporting of abuse arising in
home as opposed to school settings. While encouraging
reporting of abuse in educational settings may not have been a
primary reason for the passage of mandatory reporting laws,
these laws appear to be more successful in identifying and
addressing an additional source of abuse inflicted upon children
than in meeting the original goal of reporting abuse occurring
in home settings.
This difference between the effect of the reporting statutes
upon abuse occurring in the home as opposed to school settings
may be due in part to the design of these statutes as identified
by this review of the caselaw. Fewer problems appear to arise
from the statutory ambiguities described in the literature than
from areas in which the statutes are more clearly defined: the
provisions for immunity from suit for reporting and the
mandate for direct rather than indirect reporting by school
personnel. Each of these problems appears to impact reporting
differentially and to depend in part upon whether the abuse
occurred in a home or a school setting.
The provision for immunity from suit was designed to
remove the potentially adverse consequence of liability for
reporting by school personnel. Where false reports of abuse
arising in the home may have been filed, the cases confirm the
apparent effectiveness of such immunity. Moreover, in cases of
false reports, parents who feel wrongly accused may have a
strong desire to sue. However, providing immunity does not
reach the problem of the failure of school personnel to report
abuse occurring in a home setting when that abuse is later
confirmed. In such cases no one is available to sue on behalf of
victims of this form of abuse when it is observed but not
reported by school personnel. While immunity from suit may be
viewed as facilitating reporting, the reporting statutes do not
deal effectively with a remedy for, or consequences of, failing to
report suspected abuse in home settings. The fact that no
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immunity is available for reporting when adverse consequences
to employment result would also appear to influence reporting,
particularly of abuse arising in school settings. Failure to
report can be used as a criterion for decisions about
employment issues. This is particularly troublesome when the
alleged source of abuse is a colleague, a subordinate, or a
superior. Knowledge of the potential or real consequences upon
one's employment status may create strong disincentives to
report, especially when the abuse is inflicted by school
personnel. Erroneous or unsubstantiated reports about inschool abuse present even greater exposure to adverse
employment consequences for school personnel, especially given
the culture of school organizations which rewards cooperation
and consensus. Offsetting these disincentives to report,
however, may be the motivations for suit by a greater number
of non-school parties based on a failure to report. Both criminal
prosecutors and, more importantly, parents are motivated to
monitor a school's failure to report abuse by its own personnel.
These reasons, along with employee disputes about the adverse
consequences of their reporting or failure to report, may
account for the greater frequency of reported caselaw for abuse
occurring in schools.
The cases indicated that statutory requirements for direct
rather than indirect reporting are ignored in practice. While
the effect of this practice upon reporting of abuse arising in the
home may be less problematic than upon that in school
settings, problems remain with screening or consulting prior to
reporting. Despite teachers' better vantage point in identifying
cases where the abuse occurs in a home setting, the caselaw
illustrates their reluctance to report without consulting peers
or superiors. This may arise from their understanding of the
consequences of such reports, from personal commitment to the
continuing welfare of the child, and from their knowledge of the
services available to support that child within the school. The
utility of the mandate requiring direct reporting may be
challenged when noncompliance appears to be widespread and
to undermine the organizational culture of the school. Problems
with indirect reporting do not appear to be serious when the
abuse in question occurs in home settings. There is one caveat
which must be incorporated into this observation. While
individuals are immunized from liability, indirect reporting
may expose school districts to liability under Monell. When a
pattem of indirect reporting continues, districts may wish to
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address the policy implications of such liability directly and
develop appropriate procedures.
In situations where abuse occurs in school settings or by
school personnel, indirect reporting may be problematic. Such
cases necessarily involve an additional layer of complexity employment relationships. Consultation prior to the reporting
of abuse committed by another employee creates conflict
between school personnel. The disruptions are particularly
troublesome when a superior does not file a subordinate's
report. At that point the initial reporter has few acceptable
options. The consequences to employment status from reporting
may weigh more heavily than those of not reporting. Only the
interests of parents in isolating the offender may offset the
organizational dynamics of this class of situations.
The basic question remains: how can the social policies
behind the child abuse reporting laws be transformed by
schools into effective implementation strategies and successful
results? Our analysis suggests that an understanding of the
problems encountered in implementing the mandate for the
reporting of child abuse by school personnel is enhanced by
viewing the problem as two separate issues: abuse occurring in
home settings and abuse occurring in school settings. A clearer
understanding of the incentive structure which may influence
reporting by educators emerges from this distinction. So too,
may the basis for discussion about possible policy and statutory
reform be expanded.
Child abuse occurs in many settings. Existing reporting
statutes do not distinguish between the possible sources of
abuse and the barriers to reporting in each. Schools must deal
with abuse inflicted on children both at home and at school.
The incentives for reporting vary according to setting and need
to be addressed separately. While some coherency in reform
may eventually require state legislative action, districts can
begin to address the policy implications of the issues identified
in this review at the local level and implement strategies to
overcome the problems arising from existing reporting statutes.

